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Abstract
We develop a matching model on the marriage market, where individuals have pref-
erences over the smoking status of potential mates, and over their socioeconomic quality.
Spousal smoking is bad for non-smokers, but it is neutral for smokers, while individuals
always prefer high socioeconomic quality. Furthermore, there is a gender di¤erence in
smoking prevalence, there being more smoking men than smoking women for all edu-
cation levels, so that smoking women and non-smoking men are in short supply. The
model generates clear cut conditions regarding matching patterns. Using CPS data and
its Tobacco Use Supplements for the years 1996 to 2007, and proxing socioeconomic
status by educational attainment, we nd that these conditions are satised. There are
fewer "mixed" couples where the wife smokes than vice-versa, and matching is assor-
tative on education within smoking types of couples. Among non-smoking wives those
with smoking husbands have on average 0.14 fewer years of completed education than
those with non-smoking husbands. Finally, and somewhat counterintuitively, we nd
that, as theory predicts, among smoking husbands those who marry smoking wives have
on average 0.16 more years of completed education than those with non-smoking wives.
Keywords: Smoking, education, matching, marriage market.
JEL Codes: D1, J1.
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1 Introduction
Cigarette smoking remains the Nations leading cause of premature, preventable death; dur-
ing 20002004, approximately 443,000 premature deaths in the United States each year were
attributed to cigarette smoking (CDC, 2008). Smoking causes deaths from heart disease,
stroke, lung and other types of cancer, and chronic lung diseases. In addition, exposure to
secondhand smoke is considered an important cause of premature death and disease for in-
dividuals who do not smoke themselves, while this secondary e¤ect does not seem to exist
for smokers (CDC, 2006; Glymour et al., 2008; Mannino et al., 1997). From a more subjec-
tive perspective, a large body of survey evidence around the world shows that the attitudes
toward smoking behavior are di¤erent between smokers and non-smokers: smokers are less
likely than non-smokers to be bothered by secondhand smoke exposure.1 In a nutshell, there
are signicant di¤erences between smokers and non-smokers in the health e¤ects of and the
attitudes toward being close to a smoker: non-smokers mind being married to a smoker,
whereas smokers do not.
In this paper, we investigate the impact of this asymmetry on the formation of couples
on the marriage market. The issue at stake can be intuitively described as follows. Consider
a matching game in which individuals di¤er both in their quality, as summarized by some
socioeconomic index (reecting di¤erences in education, income, social prestige and others),
and in their smoking habit. Assume furthermore that the matching tends to be assortative
in the spouses quality index (technically, the match of two given spouses generates a surplus
that is supermodular in their indices). This tendency is however constrained by the impact of
smoking habits. When looking for a mate, non-smoking individuals perceive the smoking habit
of a potential partner as a negative trait; everything equal, we therefore expect that smokers
would be less successful in their quest for a spouse, at least among non-smoking potential
1For example, in Ireland, there is evidence based on the Dublin Healthy Cities project (50% vs. 92%). In
Australia, data from the 2004 Victorian Population Survey show that smokers are signicantly more likely
than non-smokers to be not at allconcerned about exposure to passive smoke (46% compared with 12%,
respectively). See also Pilkington et al. (2006).
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partners. However, this potential handicap disappears if their spouse is also a smoker.
In this context, the matching game generates a very simple equilibrium in a particular
case - namely if the prevalence of smoking habits is identical across genders. Then the stable
match is fully symmetric and perfectly assortative along the two dimensions (quality and
smoking habits) of heterogeneity; in practice, two marriage markets coexist, and smoking
(resp. non-smoking) men marry smoking (resp. non-smoking) women assortatively along the
quality dimension. Interestingly, in such a frictionless and perfectly symmetric world, even
a small di¤erence in a non smokers perceived well-being between marrying a smoker or a
non-smoker would result in perfectly segregated marriage markets.
Regarding smoking habits, however, symmetry is counterfactual. A striking feature of
smoking behavior is precisely the prevailing di¤erences between genders. Male smokers largely
outnumber female smokers in the United States, a discrepancy that has remained stable over
the last decades. This gender asymmetry has been emphasized by the Surgeon General (e.g.,
Surgeon General Report, 2001), as well as by several studies in various elds, e.g., Gruber
(2001) in economics and Oberg et al. (2010) in medicine. In 2007, in the United States, 26.5%
of white men 1824 years of age and 21.6% of white women 1824 years of age were current
cigarette smokers (NCHS, 2010); the prevalence of smokers among white men 2534 years of
age was 29.0% while it was 21.4% among white women of the same age (NCHS, 2010). The
symmetric solution is therefore not attainable, leading to a more complex and more interesting
problem, in which some men (the non-smokers) and some women (the smokers) are on the
short side of the market.
From a theoretical perspective, our analysis has two specic features. First, it is truly
multidimensional, in the sense that agents are characterized by two attributes (quality index
and smoking habits) that cannot be summarized into a single indicator; in this respect, it
di¤ers from matching models where marital sorting happens along only one characteristic such
as education or income (Becker, 1990; Lam, 1988), or where preferences are homogeneous over
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individual attributes (Chiappori, Ore¢ ce and Quintana-Domeque, 2010, or the search model
with two attributes by Coles and Francesconi, 2007). Moreover, one of our characteristics
(the quality index) is continuous while the other is discrete; for that reason, the approach
developed by Galichon and Salanié (2010) does not apply in our context. Second, and perhaps
more interestingly, our framework does not exhibit the kind of single-crossing property that
is typically assumed in matching models. Indeed, while the surplus function that determines
the outcome of any possible match is assumed supermodular in qualities, the interaction
with smoking habits seriously complexies the problem. In particular, one can readily check
that our setting does not, in general, satisfy the twisted buyercondition that generalizes
supermodularity in a multidimensional setting (see Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim, 2010,
for a precise statement). As a consequence, the stable match needs not to be pure; that is,
an open set of agents may at equilibrium be indi¤erent between several possible matches and
randomize between them.2
Specically, we study a model of bidimensional, frictionless matching under transferable
utility that captures the main aspects just evoked. In our setting, individual quality indices
are normalized to be uniformly distributed over [0; 1]. A match between a woman with
index x and a man with index y generates a surplus f (x; y) which is strictly increasing and
supermodular; for practical computations, we follow Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2009) and
adopt the quadratic form f (x; y) = (x+ y)2 =2. If both spouses are non-smokers, they enjoy
the full surplus. If, however, one (at least) is a smoker, then the total surplus shrinks by a
factor  < 1, representing the reduction in life expectancy associated to smoking in marriage
(and possibly the non-smokersdistaste for living with a smoker). Although our approach
focuses on two specic traits - smoking and quality, the framework we develop is suited
to investigate matching problems in more general settings, characterized by the presence of
several individual attributes, one of which is not necessarily perceived as good or bad by all
2Formally, the support of the measure that characterizes the stable match may not be born by the graph
of a one-to-one mapping; see Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim (2010) for a detailed discussion of the pureness
criterion.
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individuals on the marriage market. Moreover, it would be useful in applications where there
is a gender asymmetry in the prevalence of a certain attribute in the population. Finally, it
is important to note that our approach is purely static. In our context, smoking behavior is
viewed as a given characteristic of individuals, and we do not model the decision to start or
quit smoking. Understanding the dynamics of smoking behavior, especially in its relation to
the marriage market, is an important and interesting problem that is left for future work.
Results We fully characterize the stable matching when  is not too small, in a sense
we precisely dene, and show that it is unique. The corresponding allocation has interesting
features. First, it is not pure; an open set of non-smoking women marry either a smoking
or a non-smoking partner with positive probabilities. Second, a non-smoking woman with a
highindex will marry a high index, non-smoking man with probability one; similarly, higher
quality, smoking women are deterministically matched with high quality, smoking men, and
matching within each category is assortative on quality index. Third, non-smoking women
located at the bottom of the quality distribution are randomly matched with either smoking
or non-smoking spouses, whereas smoking women in similar situations are all matched with
smoking men; again, matching is assortative on quality indices. In particular, among non-
smoking women, only those with a lower quality index marry a smoking husband with positive
probability (and then his index is low), whereas the pattern is inverted for men - only lower
quality, smoking men may marry a (low quality) non-smoker. Finally, there is no mixed
marriage between a smoking wife and a non-smoking husband.
In practice, observed matching patterns are largely stochastic. Still, our theoretical analy-
sis suggests that these stochastic patterns should exhibit the corresponding following features.
First, mixed couples in which the wife smokes while the husband does not should be less fre-
quent than those in which he smokes and she does not; second, among couples with identical
smoking habits matching should be assortative on the quality index; third, non-smoking wives
married to a smoking husband should have a lower index than those married to a non-smoking
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husband; the same should hold for smoking husband married to a non-smoking wife. Fourth,
while there is a well-known negative correlation between smoking and education, especially
for male, the correlation should be less negative for men married to non-smoking women,
when controlling for wiveseducation.
These predictions can readily be tested on actual data; the second part of this paper is
devoted to such empirical tests. We use March CPS data combined with the CPS Tobacco Use
Supplements for 19962007.3 The TUS supplements are widely used in medical research on
cancer and other health consequences of smoking, provide a large sample size representative
of the US population, and, most of all, it allows to retrieve information on both spouses.4
Focusing on young couples, we show that there is strong sorting by smoking status: there
are 71.78% of couples were both spouses are non-smokers, and 10.01% were both smoke. Our
data also reveal that there are fewer mixedcouples where the wife smokes than vice versa,
6.50% versus 11.71% ; the corresponding ratio is 0.55, which is signicantly lower than the
0.71 implied by the sole di¤erence in relative smoking prevalence. Proxing the qualityof
a spouse with his/her education, our regression analysis conrms that among couples with
identical smoking habits matching is assortative on education. We also nd strong support for
our third prediction: among non-smoking wives those with smoking husbands have on average
0.14 fewer years of completed education than those with non-smoking husbands; conversely,
and in a more counterintuitive way from an applied point of view, among smoking husbands
those who marry smoking wives exhibit on average 0.16 more years of completed education
than those with non-smoking wives. Finally, the well-known negative correlation between
male education and smoking is conrmed in our data: an additional year of education is
associated with a reduction in the probability of smoking of around 3.6%. Moreover, if
one considers those men married to non-smoking women, the magnitude of this relationship
decreases to 2.8%. However, if one further controls for the wifes education, this correlation
3We consider couples whose husbands are between 24 and 34 years old, and wives between 22 and 32 years
old.
4Section 5 provides a comparison to alternative data sets.
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becomes even less negative (and signicantly so), in line with the fourth and last prediction
of the model.
Related literature Assortative marriage for smoking habits has been previously and ex-
tensively documented in the medical and biological literatures (e.g., Sutton, 1980; Venters
et al., 1984; Sutton, 1993), although there has been very little economic focus. In the UK,
Clark and Etilé (2006) use the British Household Panel Survey from 19911999 to document
positive sorting by smoking status. Recently, Maralani (2009) shows the existence of assor-
tative mating by smoking across old cohorts of Americans born between the 1920s and the
1950s, using data from the Health and Retirement Study. However, there is no matching
model investigating the formation of couples by smoking status, no focus on recent years, and
even less so any consideration regarding the heterogeneity of preferences between smokers and
non-smokers or the gender gap in smoking prevalence.
A key role is also played by educational attainment, an important component of the
qualityrelevant in marital sorting, which is also closely related to cigarette use. This cigarette
connection is acknowledged by economists at least since the seminal work by Farrell and Fuchs
(1982), who document a negative smoking gradient by socioeconomic status (see also Gruber,
2001). Recently, De Walque (2010), using retrospective smoking histories constructed from
the smoking supplements of the National Health Interview Surveys conducted between 1978
and 2000, shows that at least among women, college education has a negative e¤ect on
smoking prevalence, and that more educated individuals responded faster to the di¤usion
of information on the dangers of smoking after 1950. Note, however, that the gender gap
in smoking prevalence is maintained across all education levels. In 2007, the (age-adjusted)
prevalence of smokers by educational level among white men and women 25years of age and
over were as follows: 30.8% vs. 23.9% for those with less than high-school; 29.9% vs. 25.2%
for those with high-school; 21.8% vs. 19.6% for those with some college; and 10.5% vs. 8.2%
for those with college or above (NCHS, 2010).
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 relaxes some
assumptions of the model and discusses its empirical implementation. Section 4 describes the
data used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 provides the empirical results and sensitivity
analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 The basic framework
2.1 Populations and surplus
We consider two populations (men and women) of equal size, normalized to one. Agents di¤er
in two respects. First, they are characterized by their socioeconomic status; we may think of
income, education, prestige, or any combination of those. For simplicity, this status is repre-
sented by a continuous index that is uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1], although
more general settings could be considered and will be briey discussed in the last subsection.
Second, some agents smoke while others do not; an agent is thus formally characterized by
a pair (x;A) if female and (y;B) if male, where x 2 [0; 1] (y 2 [0; 1]) is the agents index,
and A;B 2 fN;Sg denes the agents smoking status (non-smoker or smoker). For the time
being, we assume that smoking is independent of socioeconomic status. Let sM and sW denote
the proportion of smokers in the male and female populations, respectively; a crucial feature
is that sM > sW , i.e., the proportion of smokers is larger among men.
We consider a frictionless matching model with transferable utility à la Becker-Shapley-
Shubik, in line with recent contributions on similar topics (e.g., Chiappori and Ore¢ ce 2008;
Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss 2009; Galichon and Salanié, 2010). In any married couple, the
sum of individual utilities is given by some function of the partners characteristics; as it is
customary in this literature, we dene the surplus generated by marriage as the di¤erence
between this function and the sum of utility levels the spouses would reach as singles. In our
framework, the surplus depends on both the socioeconomic status and the smoking habits of
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each partner. Following the previous discussion, we assume that a person who smokes does
not mind a partner with the same habit; only a non-smoking individual will perceive smoking
as a negative attribute of the potential partner, although there are direct health e¤ects of
smoking in marriage. Thus, the surplus function  has the form:
 = f (x; y) if both spouses do not smoke
 = f (x; y) otherwise
where x and y denote the wifes and husbands respective socioeconomic indices, and where
the function f is strictly increasing and supermodular, and satises f (0; 0) = 0. Here,  < 1
represents the decrease in surplus generated by the presence of (at least) a smoker in the
couple; note that the surplus of a mixed (smoker-non smoker) couple is the same as that of a
couple of smokers, but strictly less than for a non-smoking pair.5 For practical purposes, we
will focus on the quadratic case f (x; y) = (x+ y)2 =2.
2.2 Stable matching
A matching is dened as a measure d on the set ([0; 1] fN;Sg)2 and four functions
uN (x) ; uS (x) ; vN (y) ; vS (y); intuitively, d [(x;A) ; (y;B)] denotes the probability that agent
(x;A) is married with agent (y;B), and uA (x) (resp. vB (y)) is the utility of a woman (man)
with index x (resp. y) and smoking habit A (resp. B). The only constraint on d is that its
marginal should equal the initial distributions of individuals (for instance, the marginal on
the set [0; 1] fSg of smoking women is uniform with total mass sW , etc.).
A matching is stable if no matched agent would be better o¤ unmatched, and if no two
5 reects both the distaste d for spousal smoking by a non-smoker individual (indirect e¤ect of smoking
on the non-smoker) and the direct health e¤ect of smoking in marriage. To be more specic, we can write
(d;S1; S2), where d = 1 if one of the spouses is a smoker, and the other is not; S1 = 1 if the wife is a smoker,
S2 = 1 if the husband is a smoker. We assume that there are no gender asymmetries in these e¤ects, so
(1; 0; 1) = (1; 1; 0) and that the reduction in surplus due to the distaste e¤ect plus a direct health e¤ect
(for one of the spouses) is equal to the reduction in surplus due to two direct health e¤ects when both are
smokers, so (1; 0; 1) = (1; 1; 0) = (0; 1; 1):
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individuals would prefer being matched together to their current situation. This property can
be summarized by the following set of inequalities: for any (x;A) ; (y;B) we have that
uA (x) + vB (y)  f (x; y) if A = B = N
 f (x; y) otherwise
where an equality obtains on the support of d.
Existence of a stable match stems from general results. Stability, in this transferable utility
context, is equivalent to the maximization of aggregate surplus over all possible assignments;
therefore the problem boils down to the existence of a solution to a simple maximization
problem, for which one can readily check that the standard conditions are satised.
We now consider pureness. The matching is pure when the support of the measure d
is borne by the graph of a function  : [0; 1]  fN;Sg ! [0; 1]  fN;Sg, so that almost
all agents a = (x;A) are matched with probability one to the agent (y;B) =  (x;A). In
other words, pureness forbids matchings involving mixed strategies, whereby an open set
of agents may each be matched to several potential partners with positive probability. In a
one-dimensional setting, the graph of the function , which maps [0; 1] to itself, must be one
to one; if it is continuous, it can only be monotonic, and we get the standard (positive or
negative) assortativeness property. The notion of pureness thus generalizes assortativeness to
a general setting of multidimensional matching.
To prove pureness (or assortativeness), the standard approach, in the one-dimensional
case, relies on supermodularity. In a di¤erentiable setting, supermodularity requires that
the partial of the surplus function vis a vis one spouses attribute be strictly increasing
(therefore injective) in the other persons attribute. In a multidimensional setting, the natural
generalization of supermodularity is the twisted buyer condition6, which is su¢ cient to
prove pureness of the stable match. The twisted buyercondition states that there exists
6See for instance Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim (2010).
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a set XL of measure zero such that for each distinct pair (y1; y2), any critical points of the
function x  ! (x; y1)   (x; y2) lie in XL. In our specic context, this would require
that for almost all x0, the partials of the surplus with respect to the index x, computed at
two points (x0; y1) and (x0; y2), cannot be equal unless y1 = y2. One can easily check that
this property does not hold for the model just described. If a woman with index x0 is a
non-smoker, the partial of the surplus with respect to x is (x0 + y1) if she marries a non-







, if y1 = y2   (1  )x0, then the couples (x0; y1) and (x0; y2) violate the






. It follows that the stable matching may not be pure in our setting;
indeed, we will show below that it is not.
2.3 Characterization
Given the assumptions made, all couples marry, and the resulting stable matching must
maximize the total surplus generated over the populations. Regarding smoking habits, four
categories of couples (at most) may appear: two non-smokers, two smokers, and a non-
smoking wife (husband) matched with a smoking husband (wife). Moreover, within these
categories, supermodularity implies that matching will be assortative; i.e., men with a higher
socioeconomic index will marry with wives with a higher socioeconomic index.
Our main result is the following:
Proposition 1 Assume that   sM
sM+1
. There exists four values X; Y; Y 0 and p, all between
0 and 1, such that the unique stable match has the following features:
 All agents marry
 For all x  X, a non-smoking woman with index x is matched with probability 1 to a
11
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In particular, smoking men and non-smoking women marry down, whereas non-smoking
men and smoking women marry up.
 For x < X, a non-smoking woman with index x is matched:
with probability p, to a smoking husband with index
y0 =
(1  sW ) p+ sW
sM
x < Y 0
with probability 1  p, to a non-smoking husband with index
y =
(1  sW ) (1  p)
1  sM x < Y
Moreover, conditional on the index x of the wife, smoking husbands have a higher
index than non-smoking ones - i.e., y0 > y.
 For x < X, a smoking woman with index x is matched with probability 1 to a smoking
husband with index:
y0 =
(1  sW ) p+ sW
sM
x < Y 0

















The stable matching is summarized in Figure 1. It can be interpreted as follows. First,
high index non-smoking women tend to marry high index non-smoking men, and high index
smoking women tend to marry high index smoking men. Such a matching is stable because, for
a given index, a non-smoking person views a smoking potential partner as an inferior substitute
for a non-smoking one, whereas a smoking person would view them as equivalent. Among
these couples, assortative matching requires that, for any couple (x; y), the number of women
with an index above x be equal to the number of men with an index larger than y. Since
non-smoking women outnumber non-smoking men, non-smoking men and smoking women
marry up, whereas conversely smoking men and non-smoking women marry down. Below
the thresholdX, however, the stable match involves randomization: non-smoking women may
be married with either a smoker or a non-smoker, while smoking women only marry smokers.
Note that non smoking women who randomize at equilibrium must be indi¤erent between the
two potential spouses. Since they dislike smoking habits, this handicap must be compensated
by a higher index: of the two potential husbands, the smoker is therefore of higher quality.
The same patterns can equivalently be described using the husbands perspective. They
can then be summarized as follows:
 Non-smoking husbands always marry a non-smoking wife with probability 1
 Smoking husbands with a higher index (y0  Y 0) marry a high index, smoking wife with
probability 1
 Smoking husbands with a lower index (y0 < Y 0) marry either a smoking or a non-
smoking wife with positive probability. Here, however, the two potential wives have the
same quality index, since a smoking husband is neutral vis a vis his spouses smoking
status.
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2.4 Utilities and comparative statics
A by-product of the result is a derivation of the intrahousehold allocation of resources implied
by equilibrium conditions. In our case, this allocation is exactly pinned down.7 A precise
characterization is given in the Appendix. Figures 2a and 2b represent these utilities as a
function of the index for females and males respectively. Both are increasing with the index,
and the utility of a married person is always larger than if single. Moreover, the utility of a
male smoker is always smaller than for a non smoker. For wives, however, utilities of smokers
and non smokers are identical below the threshold X. Non-smoking women with an index
smaller than X marry smoking husbands with positive probability; since, from a smoking
husbands perspective, a smoking wife with identical index is a perfect substitute, smoking
and non-smoking women must have the same utility.













Female utility (dashed = non smokers, thin = singles); sM = :25; sW = :2;  = :8
7See Browning, Chiappori and Weiss (2010, ch. 8) for a detailed presentation of the technique used below.
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Male utility (dashed = non smokers, thin = singles); sM = :25; sW = :2;  = :8
One can also study the main comparative statics properties of the model. They are as
follows:
 A larger , by reducing the welfare cost of smoking, increases the threshold X, and
benets male and female smokers, but also female non-smokers; however, it hurts male
non-smokers by reducing their comparative advantage.
 Increasing the proportion of male smokers sM also increases the threshold. Its impact
on individual welfare is more complex. Among low index individuals, it hurts female
and male non-smokers, but benets male smokers. Regarding high index individuals,
a higher sM favors female smokers and male non-smokers, to the detriment of male
smokers and female non-smokers.
 Finally, an increase in sW has the opposite impact on high-index individuals, but no
e¤ect on low-index people.
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3 Extensions
3.1 Relaxing some assumptions
The previous model relies on several simplifying assumptions; we briey discuss the robustness
of the main ndings when these assumptions are relaxed. Relaxing the assumption of uniform
distributions or the functional form of the surplus does not change the qualitative properties
of the stable matching; the thresholds X; Y and Y 0 have to be redened accordingly, and
the probability p of lower index, non-smoking female marrying a smoker, will typically be
index-dependent. A second feature is that the education distribution is identical for men
and women. If this property does not hold, then it needs not be the case that, among high
index individuals, non-smoking men marry up. Indeed, while the basic assortative matching
property - for any (x; y) couple, the number of women with an index above x equals to
the number of men with an index larger than y - still holds, it no longer implies that x > y.
However, the other predictions of Proposition 1 remain valid. A third, simplifying assumption
used in the previous model is that smoking is independent of socioeconomic status; we discuss
its relaxation below.
3.2 Practical implementation
In practice, the frictionless process described in the model is never observed. Marriage mar-
kets are not frictionless; moreover, actual matching involves multidimensional characteristics,
some of which may actually be unobserved by the econometrician (a direction followed for in-
stance by Chiappori, Ore¢ ce and Quintana-Domeque, 2010, and Galichon and Salanié, 2010),
and may furthermore be a¤ected by random shocks à la Shimer and Smith (2000). For all
these reasons, observed matching patterns are largely stochastic. Still, the previous analysis
suggests that these stochastic patterns should exhibit specic features due to the underlying,
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competitive structure.8 Specically, we expect the following regularities to hold:
1. Mixed couples in which the wife smokes while the husband does not (denoted S-N)
should be less frequent than those in which he smokes and she does not (denoted N-S);
more precisely, the ratio of S-N to N-S couples should be smaller than implied by the
sole di¤erence in relative smoking prevalence, i.e., than the ratio
r =
sW (1  sM)
sM (1  sW )
In practice, in our sample, sM is :22 and sW is :17, so r is around :71; we expect the
observed ratio to be signicantly smaller than this threshold.
2. Among couples with identical smoking habits (i.e., both smokers, denoted S-S, and both
non-smokers, denoted N-N), matching should be assortative on socioeconomic status.
3. Non-smoking wives married with a smoking husband should have a lower socioeco-
nomic status than those married with a non-smoking husband; the same should hold
for a smoking husband married with a non-smoking wife. That is, a smoking spouse is
negatively correlated with socioeconomic status for non-smoking women. For men, how-
ever, the opposite logic prevails; i.e., it is now a non-smoking spouse that is negatively
correlated with socioeconomic status for smoking men.
4. In the simplied model, when two non-smoking women with the same (low) index
marry respectively a smoker and a non-smoker, the non-smoker should on average be of
lower status than the smoker. That is, controlling for the wifes quality, the smoking
habit of the husband should be positively correlated with his status. This prediction is
obviously specic to our simplied framework in which smoking prevalence is indepen-
dent of education. In practice, educated people are less likely to smoke, especially in
8One possible justication would involve a rank orderproperty a la Fox (2010).
17
the male population (Table 4). The prediction should therefore be restated as follows:
the conditional correlation between male education and smoking habit, given the edu-
cation of non-smoking wives, should be less negative than the unconditional one. Note,
furthermore, that this pattern is male-specic; it should not hold true for women.
4 Data Description
4.1 The sample
Estimations are based on the US Current Population Survey data for the years 1996 to 2007,
which provide the most recent and largest samples of married couples for whom information
on tobacco use is available, along with their detailed demographic, labor and income vari-
ables. The standard demographic, education and income variables, both at the household
and individual level, are extracted from the annual March CPS supplements, to which data
on smoking status and intensity are merged from the Tobacco Use Supplements (TUS). These
are monthly CPS supplements available discontinuously over time and in di¤erent months.
Specically, the available TUS of interest are January and May 1996, 1999, 2000; June 2001;
February 2002; February and June 2003; May 2006; January 2007.
The CPS is a series of monthly cross sections, with a short longitudinal component. In-
dividuals in the sample are interviewed eight times four times, followed by a break of eight
months, and then interviewed for the same four months the following year. As such, it is
possible to match observations of the same individuals across months, using the household
and person identication codes, along with the month-in-sample information. However, sev-
eral observations are dropped due to the specic design of the rotation samples by 4-month
periods. In addition, we also check for age, gender and race, to ascertain that the merged
observations consistently belong to the same individual.9
9Madrian and Lefgren (1999) illustrate and explain the matching procedures to longitudinally merge the
CPS respondents.
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The TUS-CPS is a National Cancer Institute (NCI)-sponsored survey of tobacco use and
policy information that has been administered as part of the Current Population Survey (CPS)
since 1992.10 It is considered a key and reliable source of national, state, and sub-state level
data on smoking and other tobacco use in US households, which is widely used in medical
research on cancer and other consequences of smoking (e.g., Delnevo and Bauer, 2009; Mills,
Messer, Gilpin, Pierce, 2009). It provides data on a nationally representative sample of about
240,000 civilian, non-institutionalized individuals ages 15 years and older.
We are able to match individuals across months, merging all these TUS supplements back
to the March supplement of the corresponding year, to build a series of repeated cross-sections
for the years 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006, and 2007. Due to the CPS rotation




, or 3/4, of
the original March sample size (when matched to June, January and May, or February, re-
spectively). In general, the farther from March the TUS supplement month is, the fewer
observations can be matched, with the strong restriction that the TUS months of September
(1992, 1995, 1998), November (2001 and 2003), and August 2006 cannot be merged back to
March, as they do not share any respondent (see Madrian and Lefgren, 1999). Nevertheless,
our sample represents the most recent and largest sample of spouses, with detailed socioeco-
nomic and smoking information, and to the best of our knowledge, it is the rst time it is
used to study marriage and smoking.
We specically extract husbands and wives from one-family households from our merged
CPS les. Married individual records of the reference person and her spouse are then matched
on the household identication code (and household number) to create a single observation
for each couple, keeping only observations of couples who lived in households with only one
family.
Our main sample of husbands and wives consists of white couples, where the wife is between
10The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) co-sponsored the TUS-CPS with NCI between
2001 and 2007.
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22 and 32 years old and the husband is between 24 and 34 years old. This demographic
group allows us to focus on recently married couples, as the sorting by smoking status and
education, and the smoking penalties in terms of spousessocioeconomic characteristics, arise
in the marriage market at the time of the match. In fact, in the US the median age at rst
marriage is 27 for men and 25 for women (US Census Bureau, 1999-2003). On the other
hand, a lower bound of 22 and 24 years old also allows us to include college graduates after
they have completed their schooling. The additional two years in the husbandsbounds are
based on the standard median / mean age di¤erence of two years between male and female
spouse (Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss, 2009). Note that the March CPS does not record the
duration of marriage; in particular, the June Fertility Supplements that used to provide the
age at (rst) marriage, do not contain it any longer in the most recent years that our study
is concerned about.
In addition to individual age, we use the state of residence, year of interview, sample
household weight and education of the individual. From 1992, the CPS records education
as degrees attained rather than years of schooling completed. We thus assign the number of
years of schooling to the corresponding degrees. March CPS household weights are used to
make our sample of couples representative of the US population.
From the Tobacco Use Supplement, we retrieve information on the smoking status of
each individual. Specically, the respondents are asked whether and how often they smoke,
whether they have smoked at least 100 cigarettes in their lifetime, and the actual number
of cigarettes they smoke.11 From the rst two questions, we construct a dummy variable of
smoking status, dening a person as a smoker if she reports to smoke every day or some days,
and has smoked at least 100 cigarettes in her lifetime, and as non-smokers those who say
that they never smoke, or those who have smoked less than 100 cigarettes in their lifetime.
The TUS vary by year in terms of the battery of questions concerning smoking, at times
also covering quitting behavior and smoking-related health problems. However, the type of
11The 2000 TUS Supplements do not record the question about the number of cigarettes smoked.
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information needed for our study on smoking status is available in every supplement under
analysis.
Finally, each respondent answers these questions, so that each spouse directly reports
his/her information. Moreover, self-reporting of smoking habits is considered a reliable source
of information, as it is found to be validated by measured serum cotinine levels (Caraballo,
Giovino, Pechacek, Mowery, 2001).
4.2 A rst look at the data
The main characteristics of the data are described in Tables 1-4 and Figures 3 and 4. We
present the summary statistics of married and single individuals, and the corresponding ones
by smoking type of couple, the observed matching patterns by smoking status, the correlations
of smoking status and education by gender and marital status, and the kernel distributions of
education by gender and marital status.12 A preliminary look at the data suggests that the
smoking prevalence is higher for men than for women, with 22% of husbands smoking versus
17 % of wives (25 and 21 % for never-married, respectively), consistently with the gender gap
reported by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS, 2010). Tables 1 and 2 also show
that women are more educated than men across all smoking categories. The health status is
very similar across spouses, and higher in couples where none is smoking than in those where
both spouses are smoking. The average number of children under six years old is about 0.80
for couples and 0.50 for never-married individuals.
Table 3 reports the observed matching by smoking status for husbands and wives. There
is strong assortative mating by smoking status: about 72% of couples have non-smoking
spouses, and 10% consists of smokers. This is in line with evidence on marital sorting by
smoking status in the UK (Clark and Etilé, 2006). However, a new and particularly interesting
insight is provided by looking at mixedcouples where one spouse is a smoker and the other
12See also Figures 1A-6A in the Appendix for the distributions of education broken down by smoking status
for married individuals.
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one is not. Our data reveal that there are fewer mixed couples where the wife smokes
than vice-versa, 6.50% versus 11.71%, so the ratio is 0.55 (s.e.=0.029), which is statistically
signicantly lower than the 0.71 (s.e.=0.021) implied by the sole di¤erence in relative smoking
prevalence.13 This nding supports our theoretical framework, in which the matching of a
smoking man to a non-smoking woman happens because of the shortage of smoking women
relatively to smoking men, given that a smoking man would prefer a smoking spouse. At the
same time, the opposite match of a smoking woman to a non-smoking man would be far less
frequent, given that all smoking women, who are in short supply, would end up marrying a
smoking man.
Regarding the correlation of education and smoking, Table 4 summarizes some clear pat-
terns. We rst note that both men and women exhibit a negative signicant correlation
between their smoking status and education. A second conclusion is that these correlations
appear di¤erent by gender, with the male gradient being signicantly larger than the female
one. These ndings are in line with the literature on smoking and education (see De Walque,
2010). In addition, Table 4 shows that these patterns are present for both married and single
individuals.
To further explore the relationship of education with smoking status and gender, Figures
3 and 4 and A1-A6, present the kernel distributions of education for men and women, overall
and for smokers and non-smokers. They exhibit a tri-modal shape, at high-school degree,
2 years of some college, and college degree for both smokers and non-smokers, even though
smokers have lower education. Women appear to be more educated than men, although the
two distributions seem quite close to each other, regardless of smoking and marital status.
All in all, these tables are consistent with the basic story presented above. Assortative
matching takes place by smoking status, with strong positive sorting and an interesting pat-
tern among the mixedcouples, given the higher smoking prevalence of men than women.
13Standard errors are computed using the delta method. The di¤erence in the ratios is statistically signicant
at the 1% (p-value=0.0000).
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Smoking and education are negatively correlated, and the male and female distributions of
education are fairly similar to each other, regardless of smoking status. The following Section
will use regression analysis to test the main implications of our model.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Main results
Table 5 presents evidence of sorting by education within smoking types of young couples,
whose husbands are between 24 and 34 years old, and wives are 22 to 32. In this Table
we regress own education on spouses education controlling for own age, year- and state-
xed e¤ects. For each group of couples, there is assortative mating by education. Although
assortative mating by education has been extensively documented in the literature (Lam,
1988; Pencavel, 1998; Qian, 1998; Mare, 2008), here we show that it holds true within each
spouses smoking category, and with magnitudes comparable to the estimated educational
sorting in the US (Pencavel, 1998). Perhaps more interesting is the fact that our estimates
also suggest that there is a gradient in assortative mating: stronger for couples were none of
the spouses smoke (0.65), and weaker for those were both spouses smoke (0.45).
The main empirical results of the paper are presented in Table 6. It contains a series of
regressions of young couples in which either wifes or husbands education is the dependent
variable and spouses education and smoking status are the explanatory variables, controlling
for own age, year- and state-xed e¤ects, broken down by own smoking status. A rst
prediction is that non smoking wives are more likely to have a smoking husband when their
qualityis low. Indeed, column (1) shows that among non-smoking wives those with smoking
husbands have on average 0.14 fewer years of completed education than those with non-
smoking husbands. In other words, a smoking husband provides a negative signal about the
education of a non-smoking wife. This pattern is not observed for smoking women: column (2)
23
indicates that there is no statistically signicant di¤erence in the average years of completed
education between those who marry a smoker and those who marry non-smoker ones and the
coe¢ cient has a much lower magnitude than in column (1). Note that the estimates in these
two columns are consistent with our models main idea and predictions: own smoking is a
negative attribute for someone who marries a non-smoker, but it is neutral when marrying a
smoker.
Regarding husbands, however, the prediction was reversed (and somewhat less intuitive):
it is now a non smoking wife which signals the lower index of a smoking husband. This is
conrmed by the ndings in column (4): among smoking husbands those who marry smoking
wives have on average 0.16 more years of completed education than those with non-smoking
wives. Again, we do not see such a pattern for non-smoking husbands: those with non-
smoking wives have on average 0.21 more years of completed education than those with
smoking wives, column (3). The magnitudes of the corresponding coe¢ cients all represent
sizable correlations, and in particular the sign of the coe¢ cient in column (4) is positive, and
opposite to the standard negative gradient between own smoking and own education.
Overall, Table 6 provides support for the two main testable implications of our model,
namely: (i) among non-smoking women those who marry smoking men are less educated, and
(ii) among smoking men those who marry smoking women are more educated.
Finally, Table 7 focuses on husbands of non-smoking women, and investigates the predic-
tion that, even though smoking habits and education are negatively correlated overall, the
magnitude of this e¤ect should be reduced for men once we control for their wiveseducation
(prediction 4). Indeed, such a control signicantly decreases the magnitude of the correlation
of male education and smoking status. This supports the theoretical prediction that among
non-smoking low-quality women, their smoking husbands are "more" educated. Columns
(3) and (4) reinforce our evidence, showing that this pattern does not hold for the wives of
smoking men; the e¤ect is actually opposite in that case.
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5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
We proceed to a few robustness checks. First, we try to take into account unobserved het-
erogeneity by adding controls for individual and household characteristics, and for the in-
teractions between state and year xed e¤ects. Our main results (signs, magnitudes, and
signicance) are robust to the inclusion of health status and number of children. Specically,
we construct a dummy variable for very healthy status (one if the status is excellent or very
good, zero if good, fair or poor), and consider the number of own children in the family who
are under age 6, as our analysis concerns young couples. The main regression specications
with these additional controls are reported in Table A1: controlling for number of children
and health status does not change our estimates. Second, we relax the denition of smoker,
by not considering the criterion based on the 100 cigarettes smoked in a lifetime. Although
the number of smokers increases, the patterns of assortative mating by smoking status and
the relationships between own education and spouses smoking remain unchanged. In terms
of years of schooling, recoding the education variable following Jaeger (1997) conrms our
ndings, as shown in Table A2.
Third, we slightly modify the age group under analysis, including younger women whose
age is between 20 and 30, and younger men whose age is between 22 and 32, to add younger
married couples who are likely to be newly-weds. This sample yields the same patterns of
results as our main estimates, as shown in Table A3, which reinforces our claim that the young
couples in our sample represent recent marriages and the actual matching in the marriage
market. The information on duration of marriage or age at marriage is not available in the
CPS in any of the years under consideration. However, our choice of very young couples along
with the very large sample size of this data set allows us to focus on recently married couples,
that is on the matches formed on the marriage market, with which our analysis is concerned.
To further explore the issue of recent marriages, we alternatively examine a very di¤erent
data source which provides the information on duration of marriage, i.e. the Panel Study of
25
Income Dynamics, and use the most recent waves from 1999 to 2007. The PSID, recently
used by Chiappori, Ore¢ ce and Quintana-Domeque (2010) to study matching patterns of
couples along socioeconomic and anthropometric characteristics, is a longitudinal household
survey collecting a wide range of individual and household demographic, income, and labor-
market variables. In addition, in all the most recent waves, from 1999 to 2007, the PSID
provides detailed information on the smoking behavior of both heads and wives, specically
on smoking status and number of cigarettes, which we use to construct the corresponding
dummy variable of whether an individual is a smoker. We then rely on the Marital History
File: 1985-2007Supplement of the PSID to obtain the year of marriage and the number of
marriages. Merging these data to the main les by the unique household and person identiers
provides the information on how recently a couple formed.
It is important to acknowledge that the PSID is a very di¤erent dataset than the CPS.
First, the PSID is a panel, not a cross-section. Second, its sample size is much smaller.
Moreover, its e¤ective sample size is, given its panel structure, even smaller. Hence, the
PSID and its availability of the relevant information on marriage duration comes with the
price of a huge reduction in sample size compared to the CPS. This dramatic reduction is
exacerbated in our analysis, which is characterized by sub-dividing the sample according to
spouses smoking status.14 Additionally, in the PSID all the variables are reported by the
head of the household, including the information on the wife. The wivessmoking behavior
is therefore proxy-reported by their husbands, while in the CPS it is self-reported.
Nevertheless, we replicate our main results on the positive sorting by smoking status, with
the asymmetric prevalence of mixedcouples (Table A4), and on the relationship between
husbandseducation and spouses smoking status, and between non-smoking wiveseducation
and their husbands smoking status (Table A5). The estimates are much noisier and not
statistically signicant. However, the signs of the coe¢ cients at stake are the same as in our
14This reduction is present although the age group has been widened to 24-36 (husbands) and 22-34 (wives),
with or without the recently married provision.
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main CPS estimates, and their magnitudes are similar or higher. The observed patterns when
using PSID data are consistent with our marriage market predictions and interpretation.15
6 Conclusions
We devise a matching model where individuals are characterized by heterogeneous preferences
and multidimensional attributes, one of which discrete. The stable match and the testable
predictions on who marries whom are derived. In light of the role of smoking in the family,
we apply our framework to explore the interaction between smoking status and education
at the time of marriage. We study for whom and to what extent smoking is perceived as a
personal defect penalized in the formation of couples, on top of the well-known health costs
and consequences (CDC, 2008). Considering these additional aspects and consequences of
smoking behavior may help health policy makers in the understanding of the actual role of
smoking and of smokers. Indeed, the vast socioeconomic literature on the e¤ects of smoking
in the family has focused on the intergenerational transmission of smoking habits between
parents and children, with distinct gender e¤ects and interactions (e.g., Loureiro, Sanz and
Vuri, 2010; Maralani, 2009).
We study the matching between smokers and non-smokers, building a model in which non-
smokers prefer to marry non-smokers. In other words, ceteris paribus, smoking is perceived as
a bad characteristic on the marriage market by non-smokers. On the other hand, we assume
that smoking is perceived as a neutral characteristic on the marriage market by smokers.
15We could not nd other data sets suitable for our study, which could compare to the reliable sample size,
and the availability of both spouses information and of young individuals characterizing the CPS. In fact,
few nationally-representative data sets provide the information on smoking behavior, and even fewer provide
it for both spouses. For instance, although the National Interview Survey has very detailed information on
smoking behavior and health, any information concerning the spouse is absent by data set design. On the
other hand, data sets such as the PSID, or its European counterparts, e.g. the BHPS and the GSOEP, provide
the information on spousessmoking but the sample size is relatively small, as they are panel surveys, a feature
that does not concern our marriage market analysis. Finally, the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) allows
to construct retrospective data on couplessmoking status but only for older cohorts (Maralani, 2009), given
that the HRS sample includes individuals who are 50 years old and above.
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Individuals sort by education level, but also by smoking status. Given the di¤erent preferences
for spousal smoking between smokers and non-smokers, and the gender asymmetry by smoking
prevalence, with more smoking men than smoking women for all education levels, smoking
women and non-smoking men are in short supply. We show that at the top of the quality
distribution, matching is pure and assortative by index and smoking habits; that is, educated
non-smoking men marry educated non-smoking women and educated smoking women marry
educated smoking men. Below some quality threshold, however, matching patterns become
more complex. While non-smoking men still marry a non-smoking spouse, smoking men may
be matched with either a smoker or a non-smoker. Equivalently, the husband of a smoking
woman is still a smoker spouse; but a non-smoking wife may be married to either a smoker or
a non-smoker. In that case, the smoker is typically of better qualitythan the non-smoker.
Using March and TUS CPS data on young couples for the period 19962007, we show that
there is strong sorting by smoking status: there are 71.78% of couples were both spouses are
non-smokers, and 10.01% were both smoke. Our data also reveal that there are fewer mixed
couples where the wife smokes than vice-versa, 6.50% versus 11.71%, that this di¤erence is
statistically signicant, and that the ratio is 0.55, which is lower than the 0.71 implied by the
sole di¤erence in relative smoking prevalence. Our regression analysis conrms the predictions
of the model in terms of equilibrium sorting and compensation. Among non-smoker wives
those with smoking husbands have on average 0.14 fewer years of completed education than
those with non-smoking husbands. Moreover, we nd that among smoking husbands those
who marry smoking wives have on average 0.16 more years of completed education than those
with non-smoking wives.
An obvious limitation of our model is its static nature: we assume that an individuals
smoking habit is given and cannot be changed. The next step will be to study the dynamic
implications of the model, in a framework where individual may change their smoking habit
at some (heterogeneous) cost. It is important to note that the static version provides the basic
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ingredient that will be needed for that purpose. Indeed, our equilibrium conditions exactly
pin down the intrahousehold allocation of welfare as a function of the education and smoking
habits of the spouses. We can therefore exactly characterize the incentives each agent is faced
with, i.e. the expected gain that they would reach on the marriage market by becoming a
non smoker (and that will be traded o¤ with the subjective cost of quitting). This is left for
future work.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Since the stable matching maximizes aggregate surplus, its qualitative features, as well
as the values of the various thresholds, can be derived from standard, variational calculus
arguments. These, however, require long and tedious calculations. Here, we adopt a more
direct approach. We rst assume that the equilibrium is as described in the Proposition, and
we provide a complete characterization, including the resulting allocation of surplus between
members; we then check that the latter satisfy the stability conditions.
Assuming   sM= (1 + sM), dene :
X =
(sM   sW ) (+ sM   sM)
sM (2  sM   sW )   (1  sM) (sM + sW )
Y =
(sM   sW ) (  sM + sM)
sM (2  sM   sW )   (1  sM) (sM + sW )
Y 0 =
(sM   sW ) (2    sM + sM)
sM (2  sM   sW )   (1  sM) (sM + sW )
and
p =
sM (2  sM   sW )   (1  sM) (sM + sW )
(+ sM   sM) (1  sW )
One can readily check that all these variables belong to the interval [0; 1].
We rst characterize the marital patterns, using the fact that since the surplus is super-
modular in (x; y), couples within a given category must marry assortatively. Therefore:
 For x  X, a non-smoking woman with index x  X is matched with a non smoking
man with index y such that the number of non smoking women above X equals that of
non-smoking men above y:
(1  sW ) (1  x) = (1  sM) (1  y)
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or equivalently:
















 Similarly, a smoking woman with index x  X is matched with a smoking man with




y   sM   sW
sW
or













 For x < X, a non-smoking woman with index x marries a smoker with probability p, a
non smoker with probability (1  p). Assortative matching implies that:
 the number of non-smoking men above y equals the number of non-smoking women
above x who marry a non-smoker:
(1  sW ) (1  p) (X   x) = (1  sM) (Y   y)
or
y = N (x) =
(1  sW ) (1  p)
1  sM x
 the number of smoking men above y equals the number of smoking women above
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x plus that of non-smoking women above x who marry a smoker:
((1  sW ) p+ sW ) (X   x) = sM (Y 0   y)
therefore
y = S (x) =
(1  sW ) p+ sW
sM
x
Women can therefore be classied into four categories, by crossing their index (above
versus below X) and their smoking habits; lets us denote these byWHN ,WHS;WLN andWLS,
where H (resp. L) reads above (below) X. Similarly, non-smoking men are either above
or below Y and smoking men are either above or below Y 0, generating four categories MHN ,
MHS;MLN andMLS. Note that at the stable matching, couples can only belong to one of the
following ve pairs of categories: (WHN ;MHN) ; (WHS;MHS) ; (WLN ;MLN) ; (WLS;MLS) and
(WLN ;MLS).
We next derive the allocation of intrahousehold welfare in each couple that supports the
equilibrium. Let uN (x) (resp. uS (x) ; vN (y) ; vS (y)) denote the utility of a female non-smoker
(resp. female smoker, male non-smoker, male smoker) with index x (resp. y). Stability
requires that:
uN (x) + vN (y)  (x+ y)
2
2
equality obtaining when x and y are matched at the stable equilibrium. It follows that:
















the partial being taken at the point y = N (x). Therefore for x < X:
u0N (x) = x+ N (x) =


















(2  p  sM   sW + psW )
(1  sW ) (1  p) y
2  K
Also, agents must prefer marriage to singlehood; this requires:







(2  p  sM   sW + psW )






for all (x; y); this implies
1  sM
(1  sW ) (1  p)
y2
2





1  sM (1  p)

for all (x; y), therefore K = 0:
Similar computations give:
 for x < X, y < Y 0 :
uS (x) = 








p+ sM + sW   psW
p+ sW   psW y
2
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and one can readily check that
uS (x)  x
2
2
; vS (y)  y
2
2
so that all agents prefer marriage than singlehood.
 for x  X :
uN (x) = x











(sM   sW )2
1  sM
+ sM   sM
sM (2  sM   sW )   (1  sM) (sM + sW )
vN (y) =
(1  sM) (2  sM   sW ) y2 + 2 (1  sM) (sM   sW ) y
2 (sM   1) (sW   1)
 1
2
(sM   sW )2
1  sW
  sM + sM
sM (2  sM   sW )   (1  sM) (sM + sW )
and














(sM   sW )2 + sM   sM
sM (2  sM   sW )   (1  sM) (sM + sW )














(sM   sW )2 2    sM + sM
sM (2  sM   sW )   (1  sM) (sM + sW )
The comparative statics predictions can directly be derived from these expressions. Finally,
we need to check the stability conditions for each possible couple. When the husband and
the wife belong to one of the ve category pairs that appear with positive probability in the
stable match, these conditions are satised, since they stem directly from supermodularity.
We therefore need to check them for the remaining 16 - 5 = 11 pairs.
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Starting with (WHN ;MHS), we must for instance check that for x  X; y0  Y 0:













x = (sM   sW ) + sM   sM
sM (2  sM   sW )   (1  sM) (sM + sW ) = X
y = (sM   sW ) 2    sM + sM
sM (2  sM   sW )   (1  sM) (sM + sW ) = Y
0
Since P (X; Y 0) = 0 by denition, the condition is satised.
In the remaining ten cases, one can show, using similar computation, that the di¤erence
u+ v S between the sum of individual utilities and the potential surplus is minimum either
at the boundary of the interval over which the expression is valid and vanishes at these points,
or at some interior point at which it is nonnegative. The explicit calculations are available on
demand from the authors.
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Summary Statistics: Married versus Singles 
Men aged 24-34, Women aged 22-32. 
CPS 1996–2007.  
  
    
  Married  
 Men  Women 
    
Age 29.44  27.80 
 (2.80)  (2.77) 
    
Education 13.66  13.82 
 (2.38)  (2.30) 
    
Smoke 0.22  0.17 
 (0.41)  (0.37) 
    
# Children under age 6  0.82  
  (0.85)  
    
N  12,035  
    
  
Singles 
(never married)  
 Men  Women 
    
Age 29.22  27.17 
 (3.12)  (3.14) 
    
Education 13.63  13.78 
 (2.41)  (2.33) 
    
Smoke 0.25  0.21 
 (0.43)  (0.41) 
    
# Children under age 6 0.50  0.55 
 (0.76)  (0.78) 
    
N 28,086  29,102 





Table 2:  
Summary Statistics: Married Couples by Smoking Status 
Husband’s age 24-34, Wife’s age 22-32. 
CPS 1996–2007.  
 
     
     
 Both Non-Smokers Both Smokers 
     
 Husband Wife Husband Wife 
     
Age 29.47 27.88 29.31 27.46 
 (2.78) (2.76) (2.87) (2.83) 
     
Education 14.01 14.15 12.64 12.77 
 (2.41) (2.32) (1.72) (1.75) 
     
Very Healthy 0.86 0.83 0.76 0.69 
 (0.35) (0.37) (0.43) (0.46) 
     
# Children under age 6 0.81 0.85 
 (0.85) (0.81) 
     
N 8,710 1,150 
     
 






     
 Husband Wife Husband Wife 
     
Age 29.28 27.66 29.59 27.68 
 (2.83) (2.76) (2.91) (2.81) 
     
Education 12.70 13.18 13.10 13.06 
 (2.33) (2.29) (1.88) (1.90) 
     
Very Healthy 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.70 
 (0.44) (0.43) (0.43) (0.46) 
     
# Children under age 6 0.89 0.83 
 (0.86) (0.84) 
     
N 1,408 767 























































Note: Sampling weights are used. 
Table 3:  
Observed Matching 
Husband’s age 24-34, Wife’s age 22-32. 
CPS 1996–2007.  
 
Weighed % and (unweighed number of observations) 
 
   
  
Non-Smoking Wife Smoking Wife 





















Regression of Smoking Status on Education 
Men aged 24-34, Women aged 22-32. 
CPS 1996–2007.  
  
    
I. Married  SUR  
 Men  Women 
    
Education −0.036***  −0.026*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
    
Test of equality χ2(1) = 29.89 
 p-value = 0.0000 
    
N  12,035  
    
II. Singles  OLS  
 Men  Women 
    
Education −0.037***  −0.030*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
    
Test of equality A t-test = 4.29 
 p-value = 0.0000 
    
N 28,086  29,102 
Note: Sampling weights are used. All regressions include the 
following additional controls: age, year and state fixed effects. 
 
A Test of equality performed after estimating the following model: 
Smoking = a + b*education + c*female + d*education*female + 
additional controls. 
The test of equality is Ho: d = 0. 
 






































Sorting by education  
Husband’s age 24-34, Wife’s age 22-32. 
CPS 1996–2007.  
 
     
     
 Both Non-Smokers Both Smokers 










     
Spouse’s Education 0.633*** 0.694*** 0.458*** 0.442*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.035) (0.034) 
     
N 8710 8710 1150 1150 
R2 0.47 0.47 0.27 0.28 
     
     
 
















     
Spouse’s Education 0.600*** 0.618*** 0.495*** 0.497*** 
 (0.031) (0.036) (0.044) (0.041) 
     
N 1408 1408 767 767 
R2 0.43 0.44 0.34 0.33 
     
     
Note: All regressions include: own age, year and state fixed effects. Reference categories: 
2007 and District of Columbia. Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors.  















Table 6:  
Regression of Education by Smoking Status on Spouse’s Education and Smoking 
Behavior 
Husband’s age 24-34, Wife’s age 22-32. 
CPS 1996–2007.  
     
     
     
 Wife’s Education Husband’s Education 
     
 Non-Smoker Smoker Non-Smoker Smoker 
     
Spouse’s Education 0.630*** 0.473*** 0.684*** 0.556*** 
 (0.012) (0.027) (0.013) (0.026) 
     
Spouse Smokes −0.141** −0.025 −0.209*** 0.160** 
 (0.060) (0.086) (0.074) (0.076) 
     
N 10118 1917 9477 2558 
R2 0.47 0.29 0.46 0.36 
     
Note: All regressions include: own age, year and state fixed effects. Reference categories: 
2007 and District of Columbia. Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors.  



























Table 7:  
Regression of Smoking Status on Education 
Husband’s age 24-34, Wife’s age 22-32. 
CPS 1996–2007.  
     
     
     
 Men with NS Women Women with S Men 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Own Education −0.028*** −0.024*** −0.021*** −0.029*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) 
     
Test of Equality 0.0146 0.0341 
(p-value)     
     
Spouse’s Education -- −0.006** -- 0.014** 
  (0.002)  (0.006) 
     
N 10118 10118 2558 2558 
R2 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 
     
Note: All regressions include: own age, year and state fixed effects. Reference categories: 
2007 and District of Columbia. Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors.  

























Table A1:  
Regression of Education by Smoking Status on Spouse’s Education and Smoking Behavior 
controlling for health status and number of children 
Husband’s age 24-34, Wife’s age 22-32. 
CPS 1996–2007.  
     
     
     
 Wife’s Education Husband’s Education 
     
 Non-Smoker Smoker Non-Smoker Smoker 
     
Spouse’s Education 0.600*** 0.460*** 0.668*** 0.541*** 
 (0.013) (0.027) (0.014) (0.027) 
     
Spouse Smokes −0.108* −0.029 −0.185** 0.164** 
 (0.060) (0.086) (0.074) (0.077) 
     
Controlling for spouse’s health 
status YES YES YES YES 
Controlling for number of children 
under 6 YES YES YES YES 
     
N 10,118 1,917 9,477 2,558 
R2 0.49 0.29 0.46 0.37 
     
Note: All regressions include: own age, year and state fixed effects. Spouse’s health status is controlled for 
by a dummy variable: 1 if excellent or very good health, 0 if good, fair or poor. Reference categories: 2007 
and District of Columbia. Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors.  





















Table A2:  
Regression of Education by Smoking Status on Spouse’s Education and Smoking Behavior controlling for 
health status and number of children adjusting education following Jaeger (1997) 
Husband’s age 24-34, Wife’s age 22-32. 
CPS 1996–2007.  
     
     
     
 Wife’s Education Husband’s Education 
     
 Non-Smoker Smoker Non-Smoker Smoker 
     
Spouse’s Education 0.598*** 0.471*** 0.667*** 0.541*** 
 (0.011) (0.028) (0.012) (0.025) 
     
Spouse Smokes −0.129** −0.018 −0.210*** 0.137* 
 (0.058) (0.085) (0.073) (0.075) 
     
Controlling for spouse’s health status YES YES YES YES 
Controlling for number of children under 6 YES YES YES YES 
     
N 10,118 1,917 9,477 2,558 
R2 0.49 0.31 0.46 0.37 
     
Note: All regressions include: own age, year and state fixed effects. Spouse’s health status is controlled for by a 
dummy variable: 1 if excellent or very good health, 0 if good, fair or poor. Reference categories: 2007 and District 
of Columbia. Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors.  























Table A3:  
Regression of Education by Smoking Status on Spouse’s Education and Smoking 
Behavior 
Husband’s age 22-32, Wife’s age 20-30. 
CPS 1996–2007.  
     
     
     
 Wife’s Education Husband’s Education 
     
 Non-Smoker Smoker Non-Smoker Smoker 
     
Spouse’s Education 0.617*** 0.429*** 0.685*** 0.546*** 
 (0.014) (0.030) (0.017) (0.030) 
     
Spouse Smokes −0.154** −0.059 −0.172** 0.199** 
 (0.066) (0.097) (0.081) (0.085) 
     
N 7861 1506 7252 2115 
R2 0.48 0.27 0.47 0.36 
     
Note: All regressions include: own age, year and state fixed effects. Reference categories: 
2007 and District of Columbia. Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors.  















































































II. Recently married:  marital duration ≤ 4 years 
  






















Table A4:  
Observed Matching 
 






   
I. Full sample 
  





















Table A5:  
Regression of Education by Smoking Status on Spouse’s Education and Smoking 
Behavior 
 
Husband’s age 24-36, Wife’s age 22-34. 
PSID 1999-2007. 
  
     
 I. Full sample 
     
 Wife’s Education Husband’s Education 
     
 Non-Smoker Smoker Non-Smoker Smoker 
     
Spouse’s Education 0.577*** 0.683*** 0.632*** 0.641*** 
 (0.039) (0.073) (0.039) (0.088) 
     
Spouse Smokes −0.213 0.052 −0.179 0.517* 
 (0.181) (0.302) (0.279) (0.268) 
     
N 2035 350 1873 512 
# Couples 945 213 881 293 
R2 0.48 0.60 0.47 0.57 
     
     
 II. Recently married: marital duration ≤ 4 years 
   
 Wife’s Education Husband’s Education 
     
 Non-Smoker Smoker Non-Smoker Smoker 
     
Spouse’s Education 0.529*** 0.792*** 0.554*** 0.548*** 
 (0.071) (0.141) (0.050) (0.087) 
     
Spouse Smokes −0.137 0.095 −0.378 0.516 
 (0.275) (0.522) (0.339) (0.407) 
     
N 941 188 868 261 
# Couples 653 141 601 198 
R2 0.47 0.63 0.43 0.67 
     
Note: All regressions include: own age, year and state fixed effects. Sampling weights are 
used. Robust standard errors.  
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